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BRITAIN’S FIRST COMPUTER CENTRE FOR BANKING: WHAT 
DID THIS BUILDING DO? 
 
At the beginning of the 1960s Barclays became the first British bank to open a computer centre. 
In this paper I trace the life of this building starting with its official opening on 4 July 1961 
and ending with its protracted closure a decade later. From initial status as the most advanced 
bank bookkeeping system in the world serving as a highly visible symbol of the bank’s 
technological power, to the final repurposing of its grandiose reception as a distribution point for 
pre- and post-decimalisation output, the building’s various meanings are revealed. Making use of 
written, oral, and visual sources I explore the centre’s spatial characteristics, its relation to the 
distributed structure of the branch, and its place as a first dedicated working home for a newly 
emerging computing subculture. A blend of multiple perspectives, internally from the top down 
and bottom up, and externally from customer and competitor, provide the basis for an analysis 
that reveals the multifaceted purpose of the first computer centre place in the banking automation 
race. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
At the beginning of the 1960s Barclays was Britain’s biggest high street bank and 
progressively earning a reputation for itself as a technological innovator.1 In 1961 
Barclays opened a computer centre in the West End of London. As the first British bank 
to officially open a building of this kind Barclays hailed it as a landmark in British 
banking automation. As a new technological place in the business of banking it offers 
rich analytical possibilities for business historians and historians of technology.  
 
In this paper I consider the significance placed by the bank on the computer centre and 
the role it played in embodying a newfound modernity for Barclays set against a 
backdrop of 250 years of banking tradition. I emphasise the importance of the spectacle 
that was the centre’s opening ceremony and highlight elements of the building’s form 
that reveal the building’s multifaceted purpose was both to symbolise and convey a set of 
ideas, as well as to provide practical working home for a computer-led orchestration of 
modern technologies and a new breed of bank clerk turned computer specialist.2 
 
I also explore the computer centre’s relationship to the traditional distributed structure 
of the bank branch and the building’s effect on those who worked within its walls and 
those who worked without. This is complemented by a look at external perceptions of 
the centre from customers and competitors alike who saw the computer both as a threat 
to traditional order and as an opportunity to improve business efficiency.  
 
By examining the effect of this building on business and social life I am building upon 
the work of Thomas Gieryn amongst others. Like Gieryn, what I offer here is an answer 
to a straightforward question: what did this building do?3 
 
 
CEREMONY AND DESIGN 
 
On Tuesday 4 July 1961 Barclays opened the No. 1 Computer Centre at 154 
Drummond Street, London, NW1,4 an event that it later asserted was the opening of 
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‘Britain’s first computer centre for banking’.5 At a grand ceremony, Anthony William 
Tuke, near the end of his twelve-year chairmanship, made a speech intended to 
maximize his bank’s achievements. In order to emphasise the progress Barclays had 
made during his stewardship he paused to reflect on the bank’s former position as 
technological laggard in the 1930s. Then, as a wave of mechanization came in the shape 
of ledger posting and accounting machines, Barclays only adopted these technologies as 
an act of ‘sheer self-defence’.6 Tuke impressed upon his audience that during his time in 
charge, however, Barclays had leapt from its trailing position of laggard to assuming the 
leading role in the application of ‘electronic methods’ to banking.7 By the end of the 
1950s not only had Barclays under A. W. Tuke become Britain’s biggest bank,8 it had 
also taken a first step in reifying its ambitions to the status of technological innovator by 
becoming the first British bank to place an order for a computer in August 1959. 
Barclays ordered an Emidec 1100 computer from British manufacturers EMI Electronics 
Limited at a cost of £125,000.9 
Tuke tempered his opening speech rhetoric somewhat by sketching out the 
cautious and careful work underpinning Barclays’ turnaround from laggard to 
technological innovator.10 This work was led by two of Tuke’s senior managers, John 
Cowen and Donald Travers. Both men had taken leading positions on the Electronics 
Sub-Committee set up in 1955 by the Committee for London Clearing Banks (CLCB). 
Cowen, a general manager and Barclays board member was its chair, while Travers, a 
general manager’s assistant and head of Barclays’ mechanisation was its secretary. In 
1955 the CLCB had tasked Cowen as the chair of the Electronics Sub-Committee to: 
 
promote discussion and research on developments in the field of mechanization 
with particular reference to electronics in so far as they may be applicable to 
banking practice, and on the impact of such developments on staffing 
problems.11 
 
Staffing problems in banking were nearing crisis point due to a shortage of personnel - 
particularly in the London area - needed to meet an ever-increasing demand for 
banking services, and an increasingly high turnover rate amongst clerical staff 
performing the routine and often boring task of customer accounting. The pressure on 
existing bank staff was great and they were struggling to cope with weekly and monthly 
peaks despite almost limitless overtime. Costs for the bank in the form of overtime 
payments and staff recruitment and training were spiralling out of control. The banks 
saw the centralized automation of branch bookkeeping using electronic computing as a 
way of averting an impending crisis. It was not the only solution, but it appeared to the 
banks to be the most promising one.12 
The Electronics Sub-Committee formed a focused three-man working party to 
research the possibilities of bringing electronic computing to British banking. 
Membership of this working party became pivotal in establishing those banks that would 
become early computing pioneers. Donald Travers, Barclays head of mechanization, 
was one of the three. From 1955 the banks, now collectively under Barclays’ leadership, 
as well as individually, met at home and abroad with a number of existing and would-be 
electronic computer manufacturers and users in order to discuss their common and 
specific requirements. Over the next few years British clearing banks began 
experimenting with centralised book-keeping using tabulators and computers alongside 
their existing mechanised distributed branch accounting operations. When satisfied that 
in principle centralised electronic computer accounting appeared the best solution to the 
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growing crisis of staff and space shortages in the London area,13 Barclays made the first 
firm commitment and placed an order for its own computer in 1959. 
In his opening speech Tuke downplayed any strategic motive behind Barclays 
privileged leading role in these developments, and instead credited simple good fortune. 
Barclays certainly left nothing to chance on the day of the computer centre’s opening. 
Everything about the centre’s opening was carefully managed for maximum effect. After 
the chairman’s speech the Postmaster General, the Right Hon. Reginald Bevins MP, 
was invited to ceremoniously open the new centre. He did so not by cutting a ribbon 
with scissors in the traditional manner, but instead by ‘cutting an invisible ray with his 
hand’.14 When his hand passed through the invisible beam the lights in the centre were 
automatically brought to life and the centre was declared officially open. For the invited 
guests watching, this futuristic act was an apt conclusion to a ceremony that had 
radiated Barclays’ newfound modernity. Behind the scenes however more traditional 
methods were still on hand. One of the computer centre staff was carefully watching as 
the MP’s hand passed through the beam and was ready to throw a power switch in case 
the centre didn’t automatically light up.15  
The very presence of the Postmaster General was a significant reflection of 
Barclays’ attitude towards technology. The Postmaster General was the ministerial 
position responsible for the General Post Office (GPO), the organisation in control of all 
communications technology that took place outside the walls of any building in Great 
Britain. Barclays’ computer centre was as much a showpiece for telecommunications as 
it was for computing technology; Barclays had worked with the GPO to link the centre 
to local branches via a network of GPO lines that brought together a complete data 
processing system. 
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Figure 1: The Postmaster General cuts the invisible beam to officially open the centre, 1961. 
Courtesy of Barclays Group Archives. 
Barclays also knew that the ceremony itself was just a beginning. With a suitably large 
and impressive reception area Barclays anticipated that the building would welcome a 
stream of visitors, including many representatives from the other banks, for years to 
come. After the opening ceremony the first of these visitors were led on a tour around 
the computer centre building where elements of this new data processing system were 
fully operational but also clearly intended for public display. Almost embarrassed by 
some of the indulgences made to visitors in the building’s design the bank’s chairman 
concluded by pointing towards a simpler design for future computer centres. The name 
given to the centre also looked towards the future; from the outset Barclays called this its 
No. 1 Computer Centre.16 
The new computer centre was an old furniture showroom with a large and 
adaptable ground floor interior space and a West End location that was conveniently 
close to some of Barclays’ biggest and busiest branches and their business customers 
headquartered nearby.17 The bank district that encompassed this area, Pall Mall, was 
second in importance only to neighbouring Lombard Street district that was home to 
Barclays’ head office. In addition to the increasing volume of business putting pressure 
on existing resources at Pall Mall branches, the district’s progressive managerial 
attitudes was also an important contributor in determining which of the two districts 
would be home to the first computer centre. While Lombard Street was steeped in 
tradition – Barclays could trace its roots back to 1690 and a goldsmith’s shop there – 
Pall Mall’s directors were renowned for their forward thinking and were not averse to 
risk.18 
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Figure 2: Card showing location of No. 1 Computer Centre, 1961. Courtesy of Jim McClymont.  
 
With location fixed, the bank’s in-house architect set about repurposing the single storey 
building to cater for the specific environmental needs of a large-scale computer and 
constructing a first home for its new workforce. There was a broader overriding 
requirement though; the architect also had to meet the political needs of Barclays’ 
management. As a result, incorporated into the building’s interior design were a number 
of features not related to the requirements of the bank’s computer or staff, but that 
ensured that ‘allowance had been made in the layout of the centre for the reception of a 
steady flow of visitors’.19 Barclays designed its first computer centre as a site for public 
display as it demonstrated its position as technological innovator amongst the British 
clearing banks. In purposefully courting publicity with its Emidec installation in London 
Barclays was following a tradition of computers and public display started by IBM with 
its SSEC (Selective Sequence Electronic Calculator) installation in 1948 in New York.20 
In the building’s interior design the computer’s specific requirements were 
certainly catered for in terms of power, and temperature, humidity and dust control. A 
large diesel generator was in place to cope with failures or fluctuations in power supply 
and thirty three air conditioning units on the roof were installed to dissipate heat output 
from the machinery to stabilise temperature and humidity levels.21 But these primary 
concessions to the computing equipment, like the hand on the switch that provided a 
backup for the opening ceremony’s invisible ray, remained out of sight. Cables and 
ducts that brought power and air were hidden behind false floors and ceilings. On show 
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were indicators that the building’s function was about much more than simply meeting 
the computer’s environmental needs; it also had to function as a suitably impressive ‘first 
of its kind’ building for a bank wishing to demonstrate its technological prowess. 
The opening ceremony took place in the building’s cavernous reception area, a 
massive space framed by white walls, a black granite floor, and a white ceiling supported 
by simple unadorned large columns. This was the building’s entry point and its most 
obvious statement of public display. Stretching along the length of one wall was a 100ft 
three-dimensional showpiece mural. The reception area (Figure 3) embodied modernist 
architectural concepts that were in sharp contrast to traditional classical bank 
architecture that symbolised stability, tradition, trustworthiness and security.22 Even by 
the standards of the most recently built branches the computer centre was a thoroughly 
modern and even futuristic building.23  
 
 
Figure 3: The spacious reception area as viewed from the entrance to the centre. The 100ft 3D 
Mural can be seen stretching down the left. Courtesy of Barclays Group Archives. 
 
 
COMPUTING AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
 
After the opening ceremony the building’s first visitors were led from the reception area 
to a specially designed viewing room enclosed by floor to ceiling glass walls that 
provided ‘an uninterrupted view of the computer and its auxiliary equipment.’24 To the 
right and on show inside the first of these rooms was Barclays’ own Emidec computer, 
installed and fully operational.25 The Emidec 1100 was the first British all-transistor 
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computer and as such regarded as an important first in a class of computers that was 
termed the ‘second generation’ computers.26 Using less power, producing less heat, 
occupying a smaller footprint, and more reliable than its valve-based counterparts the 
fully transistorised computer presented an opportunity to make a clear break from the 
computing past. In timing its formal use of computers in banking with the commercial 
arrival of the transistor Barclays was associating itself with the new.27 
On their fact-finding visits to the United States Barclays’ representatives on the 
CLCB Electronics Sub-Committee, Cowen and Travers, had been impressed by the 
innovative partnership between the Bank of America and the Stanford Research 
Institute.28 The resulting Electronic Recording Machine – Accounting (ERMA) 
specification was built by General Electric and unveiled by Bank of America at the end 
of September 1955.29 Barclays had not been involved in the design of the Emidec in any 
way approaching the level that the Bank of America was with ERMA - from 1956 EMI 
had been working closely with the British Motor Corporation30 - but Barclays let 
everyone know that it had ordered the Emidec 1100 whilst it was still in the blueprint 
stage.31 Barclays was proud of its foresight and in the technological capabilities of its 
chosen machine. Now Barclays hailed the Emidec as ‘the world’s first fully transistorized 
and magnetic core machine linked to magnetic tapes.’32 Its own configuration of the 
Emidec together with telecommunications it called ‘the most advanced bank book-
keeping system in the world.’33 
The Emidec 1100 was a machine built with business rather than scientific 
applications in mind, and this was something Barclays was keen to stress in order to 
differentiate itself from its competitors.34 EMI ambitiously marketed its medium-sized 
1100 model as a central system component of a system with the potential for integrating 
hitherto separate tasks within an organisation.35 This marketing neatly tapped into 
requirements of the business world that were markedly different from the scientific 
requirements that earlier computing efforts had predominantly been focused upon.36 
Later, Donald Travers reflected on the beginnings of the widespread commercialisation 
of computing and had this to say: 
 
The role of the equipment manufacturer was changing. He was no longer 
selling a computer. He was selling the capabilities of a system, with the 
computer only one machine in an equipment configuration at the data 
processing centre that would contain also punched card readers, magnetic tape 
units and high-speed printers; and a system which would provide also for the 
preparation of input data at branches, the transfer of data to the centre and the 
feedback of management and accounting control information.37 
 
Barclays portrayed its computer as the leader in an orchestration of technology from a 
number of different manufacturers. The Emidec was connected to Ampex magnetic tape 
drives, Ferranti FR 300 photo-electric paper tape readers, and Creed 3000 paper tape 
punches, which all served as input and output devices and were also housed in this first 
computer room.38 Barclays had colour coded the different units in the computer room 
according to their purpose and these colours were used to help describe to the visitors in 
the viewing room how each operated as part of the data processing whole. On the day 
of the initial opening ceremony visitors were directors at Barclays’ board and local 
levels, afterwards they were managers and other representatives from Barclays and 
other banks and businesses. All were welcomed inside to gaze comfortably from the 
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insulated viewing room upon the flashing lights of the computer, the busy peripherals, 
and the smooth efficiency of the machine attendants operating within.  
As part of the complete visitor experience, guests were given a glossy pamphlet 
entitled Barclays Bank Limited: Our First Computer that emphasised some of the less visible 
aspects of the new computer system. Through the leaflet Barclays extolled the efficiency 
of the new computing system in terms of its storage capacity and the speed at which it 
could deal with information compared to a traditional branch-based book-keeping 
system. The leaflet even suggested the new computer system was capable of simple 
decision making such as that done in a branch. The leaflet listed the input/output and 
processing capabilities of the computer system [emboldened in original] thus: 
 
It can store a lot of information: the entries on 9000 full ledger sheets can be 
stored on 1 reel of magnetic tape, 3600 feet long. It can read information from 
paper tape very quickly: nearly 700 entries in 1 minute. It can sort 
information very quickly: 1000 entries can be sorted in 45 seconds. It can 
perform arithmetic very quickly: a credit can be added to a balance in 140 
millionths of a second. It can make simple decisions: answering the question, 
‘Does the balance exceed the limit?’ takes 410 millionths of a second. It can punch 
out paper tape very quickly: a statement sheet of 28 entries is produced in 4½ 
seconds.39 
 
A second computer room, a mirror image of the first, was purposely empty on opening 
day. The room’s emptiness allowed Barclays to make another statement about its 
technological future. Visitors were informed that this space was reserved for a second 
Emidec that Barclays would order from EMI later that year. Barclays needed two 
machines because it knew from its experimental work that the throughput of one Emidec 
system operated by a single shift would be about 40,000 accounts with approximately 
16,000 update entries per day.40 That equated to the number of accounts held by twelve 
large busy West End branches. Barclays envisaged automating a larger number of 
branches when it designed its first computer centre, and there was talk of a ‘take-on’ 
target set for Donald Travers’ team at the No. 1 Computer Centre of 50 London 
branches.41 Although its branch network in England and Wales at the time numbered 
over 2,240 branches,42 Barclays limited its first automation efforts to a comparatively 
small number of branches in London. The bulk of its business took place in Britain’s 
financial capital, and in the 1960s it was here that the pressure on staff and space was 
most acutely felt.43 
Past the two computer rooms and right at the back of the building were the 
communications bays that connected the centre to twelve Barclays’ branches initially. 
There were 24 GPO lines in total allowing for simultaneous input and output from and 
to each branch. Barclays had cast the operation of its own electronic computer system as 
an important British banking first, but with the communications bays it pressed home its 
real achievement. Here it portrayed the Emidec computer system as but one part of a 
sophisticated data processing system that linked branch and computer centre together 
by telecommunications. Twenty-four GPO lines and teleprinters allowed branch entries 
to be input remotely to the computer centre and statement and ledger output back to 
the branch simultaneously. There was nothing so old fashioned as the movement of 
vouchers and paper between branch and centre. The Banker described this system 
connecting two separate places as a world first.44 
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Figure 4: The communications bay showing the punches re-perforating paper tape transmissions 
from the branches, c. 1962. Courtesy of Don Harvey. 
 
THE ICE MACHINE 
Barclays had one last trump card to play with the technology it placed inside its 
computer centre. Up until this moment Barclays had only been able associate itself with 
the prestige of technology by proxy, but now, in a perfect example of a consumer turned 
producer,45 it had installed a piece of equipment in the centre that had been wholly 
conceived, designed, and prototyped by its own staff. This was the Input Checking 
Equipment, or ICE machine. Barclays drew special attention to this technology in its 
press release: 
 
At intervals the punched paper-tape is transmitted over the teleprinter lines to 
the Centre, where a duplicate tape is automatically produced. Before these tapes 
are passed to the computer they are checked electronically to detect very 
occasional punching or transmission errors. The computer would in fact find 
these errors itself, but by disposing of these errors in advance the introduction of 
this input checking equipment (ICE) allows the computer to operate at its 
greatest efficiency. ICE was designed by a member of the Bank’s staff, as there 
was no equipment on the market, or under development, which would perform 
this checking function, and considerable interest has been aroused in the data 
processing field by this machine.46 
 
The ICE machine performed a simple but important function. From opening at 9 a.m. 
until closing at 3.30 p.m. each branch connected to the centre would punch out five-
channel paper tape that contained the day’s debits and credits to be applied to customer 
accounts. These transactions would be transmitted in batches of fifty or a hundred 
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across the GPO line to the computer centre where they would be reproduced as paper 
tape input for the Emidec. In the early 1960s these lines were expensive but for small 
distances just affordable to big business and fairly reliable. A standard speed data 
transmission of 10 characters per second gave typical line error rates of 1 in 10,000 for 
the bank’s book-keeping entries. No matter how low the error rate was however 
Barclays had to ensure that none of these errors could ever reach a customer’s 
account.47 So Barclays took a belt and braces approach to tackling the issue of line 
errors. The standard BAUDOT type code used by the GPO had its roots in the 
transmission of text for telegrams. Line errors causing dropped bits for these alphabetic 
characters were noticeable and not a major cause for concern, but errors in the numbers 
that were the foundations of the bank’s business could have catastrophic consequences. 
It wasn’t just line errors that Barclays had to guard against in this new data processing 
system; errors could also be introduced at source in the branch through mis-keying of 
input or by the paper tape perforator machines in the transmitting branch or at the 
receiving centre. It was in fact these input mistakes and punching errors that caused far 
more problems than the line errors.48  Consequently Barclays replaced the GPO’s 
standard 5-bit BAUDOT code with its own 4-bit plus parity code that allowed a parity 
check to be performed for each transmitted credit or debit. In addition it trailed each 
batch of transactions with a total for reconciliation purposes.  
With parity code and reconciliation totals now in place thought had to be given 
to the most efficient way of checking these at the centre. The programs on the Emidec 
had been written so that they checked that the sum of the transactions matched the 
batch total, but detecting errors as part of the branch update programme created an 
unacceptable delay for both branch and centre. Updating the accounts for each branch 
could not take place until after the branch had closed for business at 3.30 p.m. While an 
error would be picked up as part of this update, it would cause the whole update 
programme to stop while the source of the error was determined and the branch re-
transmitted some of its entries. Ideally what was needed was a way of checking the 
branch entries as and when they arrived during the day. 
The Emidec was needed during the daytime for testing and training so another 
checking solution that did not involve the Emidec was required. With nothing suitable 
available on the market, here was a problem in need of a bespoke solution. Two of 
Barclays’ staff at the computer centre, Davey-Thomas and Doug Pearce, met the 
challenge by designing and building a device for checking the transmitted paper tape. 
Both men, like so many of the early bankers recruited into computing, were keen 
hobbyists with interests in amateur radio and electronics consolidated during a period of 
National Service. Having the requisite technical skills and understanding that what was 
required was really a simple parity checker, the two men built an initial working 
prototype of the ICE machine using mechanical relays. The prototype machine was 
slow, but it proved their concept. Barclays then partnered with a small electronics firm, 
RDL, to bring a transistorised version into production. These transistorised ICE 
machines were demonstrated in place and fully functional on the centre’s opening day.49 
Something that the visitors’ attention was not drawn to was Barclays’ often more 
low-tech solution to error correction.50 As batches of entries were received during the 
day they would then be read in and validated by the ICE machines. If a machine 
detected a parity error it would stop and mark the tape highlighting the error. It was 
then an operator’s job to perform the necessary error correction. Sometimes this 
involved a retransmission from the branch, but usually it was no more than a case of the 
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operator flicking the tape to dislodge a stubborn chad left behind from an incomplete 
perforator punch.51 
 
 
WORK AT THE COMPUTER CENTRE 
 
The tour of the centre was about a show of computer and telecommunications strength, 
but it was also about its controlled operation. In the transparent computer rooms visitors 
had been able to see the computer operators working within and hear their work 
explained in relation to the machines they were tending. The tour now involved 
communicating to visitors the role of Barclays’ programmers whose mental labours were 
made visible in the form of flowcharts and machine code on display. The programmers’ 
rooms contained exhibits of the ‘extremely detailed instructions’ that its specially trained 
staff had been responsible for preparing. This display served two purposes. It was not 
only to communicate to visitors what this new breed of banking staff, the programmer, 
did, it was also to dispel any notion of the Emidec being an ‘electronic brain’ doing the 
thinking all of its own accord. Barclays stressed that impressive though its chosen 
technology was, there was no danger of it making decisions on customer accounts of its 
own accord. It could only do what the programmers told it do, and visitors were 
reminded that Barclays programmers, like its computer operators, were all bank clerks 
first and foremost who knew the business of banking. It was only atop a solid set of 
banking foundations that specialist programmer and operator training from EMI had 
been built.52 
The centre’s first programmers and operators were those bank employees that 
had experimented with centralised accounting using tabulators and computers in the 
1950s under Travers. During the centre’s first years of operation the team expanded 
drawing in staff from Barclays’ branch network that had shown a particular aptitude for 
working with machines. These were the clerks who worked in the back office of a 
branch or machine room. The most senior of these back office clerks was the Officer in 
Charge of Mechanisation (OC Mech), and although the machine room was 
predominantly staffed by women the OC Mech in charge was sometimes a man. It was 
from this pool of male OC Mechs that many of the centre’s first computing workers 
were predominantly drawn.53  
Prospective programmers and operators were often approached informally and 
in the main were more than happy to move to the centre from the branch, some even 
relocating to London, because they saw the move as an opportunity and a new 
challenge. In any case many of those approached didn’t fit comfortably within the rigid 
confines of the branch and some were even self-described ‘trouble makers’.54 As an 
alternative to them becoming increasingly de-motivated or leaving the bank, they were 
redeployed instead to the No. 1 Computer Centre. Once there they experienced a 
welcome liberation of sorts and the subculture of the branch machine room was 
amplified in the bigger surroundings of the computer centre.  
The programmers and operators were in the main young men, although initially 
a significant proportion were also women, between the ages of 20 and 25 years of age.55 
From the outset computing and youth were seen as going hand in hand. A thirty one 
year old interviewed as a programmer although accepted was seen as being significantly 
older than the accepted norm.56 The first computer operators and programmers 
underwent a three-week training course at EMI’s factory at Hayes, Middlesex and then 
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worked on the Emidec at Hayes prior to its delivery to the centre. By the live date they 
had built up considerable experience of the machine.57  
The centre’s programmers and operators became part of the ongoing visitor 
experience. On a regular basis important visitors, including representatives from other 
banks, would be met in the impressive reception area by the head of Barclays’ 
mechanization, Donald Travers, who would pause on the way to the computer rooms 
by the door of one of the white ceilinged, white walled offices. He would quietly open 
the door and point inside the programmers’ room whispering to the visiting crowd, 
‘these are our programmers.’ Later, as the visits became embedded in the weekly life of 
the centre, one of these programmers would adopt the role of computer centre tour 
guide.58 
As well as two rooms to house the programmers (senior and junior) other 
internal work spaces included the assistant manager’s office, maintenance workrooms, a 
lecture room for on-site training, an office for the on-site EMI engineers, and a mock up 
of a typical branch.59 Whilst Barclays’ architect had allocated space for the practical, 
these rooms all lay off the main central space that was the building’s reception area, and 
it was this reception area that dominated the building’s interior design. The 
programmers affectionately named the reception ‘The Elephant House’ and 
‘Stonehenge’, two names that reflected the relative size of the reception area compared 
to their own working space and its primary function as a meeting place for groups of 
gawking visitors that made it akin to the entrance of a tourist attraction.60 The 
repurposed building was far from ideal as a working computer centre. The showroom’s 
relatively low ceiling height meant that the introduction of false floors and ceilings to 
conceal cabling and ducts resulted in a building that felt rather cramped in those spaces 
outside of reception.61 The needs of the staff working at the centre and the building’s 
long-term future came second to the initial impact Barclays wanted to make.62  
In its first year, with one Emidec serving a handful of local branches, there was a 
chief programmer, two other programmers, and four computer operators working at the 
centre. Although there appeared to be a clear division of labour indicated by these job 
roles, in practice the centre provided a fairly informal working environment compared 
to the rigid hierarchy of the branch. There was a great deal of camaraderie amongst the 
workers in this new environment and although there were designated job roles in 
practice ‘everybody tended to do a bit of everything.’63  
Overseeing all of the work at the centre were a manager and controller who 
were both former chief clerks drawn from branches. The chief clerk was a position of 
authority below that of branch manager who overlooked the operations of the cashiers. 
The chief clerk from the first branch, Cavendish Square, had been made controller of 
the computer centre.64 The manager and his deputy, the controller, oversaw the 
operations and programming that took place at the centre, but without the strict 
hierarchy that characterised working life in a branch. The absence of customers, weekly 
visits aside, made for a more relaxed attitude with everyone on first name terms. 
In addition to the computing team there was a small team of communications 
staff, almost entirely made up of women, responsible for ensuring receipt of the paper 
tapes in the centre and then carefully winding them and placing them onto spikes. The 
centre also required a receptionist to front the large reception area and a number of 
maintenance staff. The Barclays’ workers at the centre were augmented by on-site EMI 
engineers who were there to deal with machine failures, which although frequent by 
today’s standards, were dealt with swiftly ‘99% of the time’.65  
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Initially work at the centre was organised into a single daytime shift 9-5 
weekdays and 9-1 on Saturday.66 This time structure was inherited from the branches 
and like working time in the branches these hours were only indicative. The expectation 
in branches was that you left work only when all of that day’s work had been balanced. 
Branch staff had long been used to unpredictable finish times that could play havoc with 
domestic arrangements.67 The branches may have closed to the public at 3.30 p.m., but 
there was much work once the doors had closed and a 5.00 p.m. finish was seldom 
guaranteed. This branch culture of staying behind until everything had reconciled was 
easily translated into a culture in the computer centre where it was expected you stayed 
until all processing had been completed. Flexibility at the centre was very important as 
the workers got to grips with a new system and youth was an advantage here too. Hours 
were typically longer than those worked in the branches and although overtime was 
paid, the primary working incentive in this new environment was a newfound freedom. 
Staff at the computer centre were not only used to working late but some also positively 
thrived on it using out of hours unpaid working time in which to refine and develop new 
programs for the Emidec at the centre.68 
Even though there was an increased autonomy and a more meritocratic feel to 
work at the centre, there were still important elements of the inherited branch culture 
that persisted. They may have been specially trained by and working alongside 
computer specialists from EMI but this first batch of Barclays computer operators and 
programmers were all paid a standard bank clerk’s wage. This inherited pay structure 
held strong until the middle of the 1960s. Up until this time their assignment to the 
computer centre was seen as a temporary one with it ‘envisaged that they [would] 
remain at the centre for three years after which they [would] be returned to normal 
banking duties.’69 A move to the computer centre was viewed as a temporary 
secondment, with the centre’s programmers, operators, controllers, and managers 
expected to resume their ‘proper’ career in banking once the automation work had been 
completed. 
 
 
WORK IN THE BRANCH 
 
The first Barclays’ branch to be served by the No. 1 Computer Centre was nearby 
Cavendish Square branch. Because it was the very first branch to be automated normal 
book-keeping operations had been run in parallel with computer accounting for a few 
months prior to the centre’s live date. On 4 July 1961 however, the ledgers in the 
branch were updated no more and the sole authoritative source for customers’ current 
accounts became the magnetic tapes held at the centre. This was the date when the first 
Barclays’ branch lost its independence. Month by month more branches were cautiously 
‘taken on’ by the centre, one at a time, with Bond Street and Marble Arch following 
Cavendish Square.70 By February 1962 the centre had taken on a total of five 
branches.71 
As part of the take on process each branch would appoint a member of staff to 
act as a liaison officer – with the biggest branches appointing two - and it was his or her 
job to act as the primary point of contact between mechanization department’s take on 
team and the branch staff. This was a key role instrumental in managing the change in 
the branch as a result of the switch to automation. A liaison officer experienced in the 
automation process would often move from branch to branch to oversee the necessary 
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account personalisation, introduction of new technology, and the change in branch 
procedures required before computer accounting could take place.72 
Perhaps the most significant of these changes was the need now for cheque and 
paying in slip personalisation and account numbering in the branch. Prior to 
automation, branch staff had kept paper and card records sorted by customer name, 
and chequebooks were a generic standard format personalised only by the customer 
adding his or her signature. Bank clerks became skilled at recognising customer accounts 
by these signatures alone. However the introduction of computer book-keeping meant 
that each account now had to have a unique identifier that was in the form of a number. 
A team within mechanization department had the job of visiting the branch prior to 
take on to perform the necessary account personalisation.73 The introduction of account 
numbers meant that automated branches now had to issue customers a book of 
personalised cheques. Somewhat paradoxically the process of account personalisation 
meant that branch staff had to deal carefully with customers who saw a pre-printed sort 
code, account number, and name on their stationery as representing a de-
personalisation of their relationship with the bank. Initial guidance was issued to 
cashiers that they should gently remind customers to write their account numbers on 
paying in slips, but if the customer objected that they should inconspicuously fill this in 
instead. 
The new computerised and centralised accounting system was sold to branch 
managers as a way of releasing space and time in branches so that their staff could enjoy 
better working conditions and provide a better service to customers. In the machine 
room space was freed as the ledger/statement posting machines were replaced with an 
NCR 3208 Waste machine modified to add a paper tape punch and a Creed 6S/6M 
paper tape reader to transmit entries via GPO line to the computer centre (see Figure 5), 
but space was also consumed in the branch as a result of computer automation. The 
requirement for personalised accounts meant that space was required within the branch 
to hold a library of personalised cheques. A move to centralise this storage and send new 
chequebooks to customers by post was made later.74 The branch also required a 
teleprinter in order to receive reports from the centre for checking purposes and on 
which to print customer statements and the copies they retained in the branch in place 
of ledgers.75 It was the biggest branches, some having upwards of ten accounting 
machines, that realised the greatest net gains in space. 
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Figure 5: Communication of information between branch and centre, 1961.76 Courtesy of Barclays 
Group Archives. 
 
The increased capacity of the centralised system meant that more business could be 
taken on in an existing branch without additional machines or staff in the branch. The 
computer offered a new flexibility that could meet the growth in demand for banking 
services in the 1960s. As one manager from a competitor bank observed on a visit to 
Barclays No. 1 Computer Centre: 
 
This […] point was proved by one branch which obtained a new group of some 
50 active accounts which under the conventional system would have meant an 
additional posting machine and perhaps extra staff at the branch. In fact the 
additional work was hardly noticed at the branch and was not significant to the 
computer.77 
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As the automation programme progressed Barclays’ head office was keen to stress to 
branch managers with branches planned for inclusion that they would always remain in 
control of their customer accounts. Head office circulars were sent out to branch 
managers to set an appropriate tone for the introduction of the new computerised 
system. One circular stressed that a preservation of the power relationship between the 
branch and the computer centre was central to the bank’s automation strategy [italicised 
in original]: 
 
[I]t is cardinal to all our thinking that the branch is the master and the 
computer centre the servant. So, as ways and means of improving customer 
services or the service to branches begin to be seen, the computer system will be 
subjected to O. & M. [organisation and methods] scrutiny just as our 
conventional services and systems have been and are being. 
The branch manager continues to be responsible for all decision making; and 
the management team at the [computer] centre will never be without a man 
who has had experience in branch management. […] [W]e shall be surprised 
and disappointed if greater distances should impair the excellent team spirit 
which exists today between staff at computer branches and at our No. 1 
Centre.78 
 
At first the branch manager was firmly master and computer centre servant as the 
following example of statement production illustrates. In the branches overdrawn 
balances had always been represented in red and this was a feature branch managers 
were adamant remained in place when a branch was automated. The high-speed Anelex 
printers at the centre could not make use of a black/red ribbon whereas the teleprinters 
in the branch could. Consequently statement production was initially done via a 
teleprinter in the branch (Figure 5). Although this was slower than printing at the centre, 
it did preserve an existing structure and also allowed Barclays to further extol the virtues 
of its advanced telecommunications system where no paper at all passed between 
branch and centre. However over time existing structures formed around the branch 
were replaced with new ones created from the centre. Sometime before April 1963 
printing was moved in-house to the computer centre as the teleprinters struggled to keep 
pace with statement volume and branch managers were finally persuaded to accept DR 
next to an overdrawn balance in place of red print.79 
There were ramifications for the branch in terms of space and the power base 
presided over by the branch manager, but what was the impact of the emergence of the 
computer centre on the branch staff themselves? After all the introduction of computers 
was seen as a solution to a staffing crisis and the computer promised to handle work 
previously done by Barclays’ staff. When this was first mooted the banking unions had 
been worried that the introduction of computers would mean staff redundancies. Back 
in 1956 the unions had signposted their intentions to resist the introduction of 
computers if they were to displace staff and they sought assurance that staff affected 
would be retrained and deployed elsewhere. The back-office routine work that 
computers were to replace was largely done by women and an enlightened National 
Union of Bank Employees (NUBE) was also at this time pressing for equal pay between 
men and women in banking at a time when the pay gap was widening.80 Union fears 
proved to be premature as the 1960s saw a boom in the business of banking. The 
Payment of Wages Act of 1960 began to have a real impact by the first quarter of 1963 
when a section of the act authorising payment of wages by cheque came into force.81 An 
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account with a clearing bank was the easiest way of cashing a cheque. British banks 
were busier as a result as a larger proportion of the population required banking services 
and the number of branches to supply these services increased. Although the 
introduction of computerised and centralised book-keeping allowed a single branch to 
cope with a greater number of customers it did not alter the way the banks served their 
customers. The high-street branch was the means by which banks did business with 
their customers and in order to reach more of the population in a wider geographic area 
banks had to open more branches.  
Peak workloads at the start of the week and end of the month were particularly 
difficult to manage though and computerised book-keeping smoothed out these peaks 
and allowed existing staff to better cope with existing volumes of work. The introduction 
of computers was seen as ‘relieving the pressure on existing staff.’82  The staff in the 
branch still had plenty of work to do serving increasing numbers of customers and there 
were still many manual processes to perform. The computer centre didn’t handle all the 
accounting functions within a branch. To begin with account processing was limited to 
the current, loan, and personal loan accounts.83 It is not difficult to see why those 
working in the branch were not unduly worried by the introduction of a computer; most 
saw it as an aside as much of the work in the branches carried on as before.84 In its first 
few years the computer and the computer centre was seen as an adjunct to bank 
business, and despite the chairman’s claims from the top, those working in automated 
branches below saw it as ancillary rather than revolutionary. The small minority of 
branches that were automated were certainly freed of some work but lots of other work 
carried on the same and there were an increasing number of customers to serve. 
 
 
MANAGING CUSTOMER PERCEPTIONS 
 
The introduction of new technologies and working practices in the branch as a result of 
computer centre automation took place in the back office. A customer looking around 
the banking hall of his or her branch on a routine visit to cash a cheque would have 
noticed no change in the arrangement of branch space, but this is not to say that 
customers did not experience change. The cheque itself was the site for a series of 
changes that directly affected the customer served by an automated branch. The 
inclusion of Magnetic Ink Character Recognition (MICR) characters for branch sort 
code and account number in the E13-B font at the bottom of cheques now bearing their 
pre-printed name was something to which customers had to become accustomed. It 
wasn’t just the cheque layout that changed: in preparation for automated clearing, 
paper size and thickness all had to be standardised too. These changes had an effect on 
common customs, as a cheque was now only supposed to be used against the account on 
which it was issued. In theory this meant the practice of borrowing a blank cheque from 
a friend when you reached the end of your chequebook had to stop. In practice 
however, the bank, sensitive that these stricter controls might alienate some of its 
customers, provided some leeway from the more stringent requirements of computerised 
banking. While customers grew used to the changes it allowed cheques from other 
accounts to be used providing that the pre-printed name and account number were 
deleted. When using paying in slips customers who did not write on their account 
number were not requested to do so, but instead a member of staff would look up the 
account number against a list of names held in a card index and fill in the details for the 
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customer.85 This was a period of change for customers set in their banking ways and the 
much touted increased personal service afforded by the computer was needed for this 
transition period. Barclays had to manage customer perceptions so that the requirement 
for customers to now refer to themselves by number in certain scenarios did not in fact 
mean that they were merely a number to the bank.86 
Changes to cheque format, layout and use were one visible change; customers 
also experienced change regarding their statements. Both the look of the statement and 
the nature of statement ordering changed. Previously a customer would be able to visit 
his or her branch and request a statement that could be produced on demand. With the 
move to centralised accounting the flexibility of on demand statement production was 
lost. Customers were now required to give the branch 24 hours notice when they 
required a statement. This was to allow for the request to reach the computer centre 
from the branch and the completion of batch processing with the resulting customer 
statement being sent back to the teleprinter in the branch for printing the following 
morning.87 Centralised production for both the initial remote and the later local printing 
of statements meant a change for customers too. The days and dates of weekly and 
monthly statements were moved to meet the computer centre’s requirements rather 
than those of the customer.  
In an attempt to carefully manage customer perceptions of automation Barclays 
issued each customer that would be affected with a specially commissioned leaflet 
entitled Our First Computer.88 In this first district, the prestigious Pall Mall, customers were 
mainly important businesses, and it was paramount to Barclays that it avoided 
alienating or even losing this important customer base. It had to sell the change to them 
and it did so by presenting automation at the computer centre as the only practical and 
sensible solution to the growing cost of providing a branch banking service. The key 
advantage of electronic book-keeping by computer was stressed as a reduction in 
spiralling costs associated with staff, premises, paperwork and equipment. The response 
to the question ‘why a computer?’ was because without a computer ‘it might well be that 
in a few years time we should be unable to provide you with an adequate banking 
service at a cost which you could reasonably be expected to pay’. Barclays pressed home 
in its direct customer communications and a number of newspaper and magazine 
advertisements that computers would contain and reduce the cost of banking and also 
allow branch staff to provide a more personal service.89 
As part of a wider discourse, anthropomorphic representations of computers 
were a common way of explaining computers that those unfamiliar with them could 
understand. The ‘electronic brain’ had been a powerful, if misleading, early metaphor 
used by the popular press to convey the electronic computer concept to a wider public 
audience.90 In a number of advertisements in business magazines and newspapers 
Barclays now recast its computer not as a giant brain that could do thinking of its own 
accord, but as ‘workhorse’ that took away the drudgery of accounting from branch staff 
now freed up to provide a service that was ‘proportionately more efficient.’91 
But not all the bank’s customers, nor its staff, were convinced that the computer 
was a faithful servant or that technological progress equated directly with increased 
customer service. One customer’s polemic, ‘Give Me Back My Ledger’ published in 
Punch magazine and later reprinted in 1962 in the Barclays’ staff publication, Spread 
Eagle, re-awakened the importance of trust in a relationship between customer and bank 
potentially undermined by automation efforts. The computer’s negative presence was 
felt in two ways. First the characters in the E-13B font at the bottom of customer’s 
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cheques were seen as a constant reminder that a computer was now in control of a 
customer’s account. These magnetic ink characters were described as ‘a string of figures 
of the kind beloved by electronic machines, where the 7s look like question marks and 
the little blobs and the chimney pots break out from time to time.’ The increased 
visibility of the computer’s presence was an irritant, but the growing invisibility of 
customer accounts was a bigger issue resulting in both practical and emotional concerns. 
Using magnetic tapes to store customer accounts was seen as a long way away from the 
easy readability of the branch ledger. Whilst computer media such as punched cards 
and paper tape were touchable with the holes representing account entries clearly 
visible, information on magnetic tape was both untouchable and invisible. With the 
ability to read this new medium now resting firmly with the computer, customer trust 
now had to be placed in machine as well as man.92 
Furthermore the creation of a special centre to house the computer served to 
elevate its status, and holding customer account information within the centre’s walls 
removed the account from the long-established trust and security of the branch. In spite 
of efforts by the bank to explain to customers how the links between branch and 
computer centre would work, the presence of a number of devices involved in 
establishing these links brought to mind more opportunities for failure or even the 
possibility of random numbers being generated like those from ERNIE.93 The computer 
centre and its contents were now seen as especially vulnerable to attack, with imaginings 
of ‘the hooded representatives of a rival bank stealing into the Centre at dead of night 
with an enormous magnet and in an instant utterly demolishing all the records. Or they 
might feed false information to the computer, turning all my pluses to minuses and vice 
versa.’94 Perhaps fanciful, and not wholly representative, the concerns of one customer 
do provide a useful articulation of the broader issues concerning customer trust, 
security, accountability, and personal service that Barclays needed to address as it 
moved from the self-contained production unit of the branch into a distributed model of 
accounting that connected branch with computer centre. The banks were certainly 
aware that vocal minorities like these could be disruptive and they sought not ‘to dismiss 
any criticisms of our system in a cavalier way’ but instead to address customer concerns 
in order to remove resistance to the changes introduced by automation.95 
 
 
THE OTHER BANKS 
 
Barclays undoubtedly went to great lengths to make a powerful statement when it 
opened its first computer centre, but is its claim of the first computer centre for banking 
in Britain valid? And furthermore how did the opening of the first computer centre for 
banking relate to the automation efforts of the other British banks at the time?  
The other clearing banks that made up the ‘Big Five’: Lloyds, the Westminster, 
the Midland, and the National Provincial were only a matter of months behind 
Barclays, with Lloyds the closest follower opening its computer centre in the West End 
of London in September 1961.96 However it was another smaller English bank, Martins, 
which gave Barclays the closest run for its money. Martins, although much smaller than 
Barclays with only 600 branches to Barclays’ 2,240, was the largest British bank not to 
have its head office in London at that time. Despite its smaller size, like Barclays it had 
also been represented on the three-man CLCB’s Electronics Sub-Committee working 
party. Like Barclays this placed Martins in somewhat of a privileged position, and at the 
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start of 1960 Martins became the first British bank to successfully process the accounting 
and statement production of one its branches with an electronic computer. It did this at 
Ferranti’s London Computer Centre and shortly after placed an order for its own 
Pegasus II to be installed at its Liverpool head office.97 Martins could have had the first 
British computer centre for banking if it were not for a three-month delay as a result of a 
strike by Ferranti’s subcontractors. As it was Martins officially opened its computer 
centre a month later than Barclays on 18 August 1961.98 
Barclays had also considered the Ferranti Pegasus alongside the AEI 1010 as one 
of two credible alternatives to the Emidec 1100 on its computer shortlist of three. Whilst 
there was a strong argument that favoured the Emidec because of its technical merits, 
including the technical and political importance of having an all transistorised machine, 
the final decision to go with the Emidec was made because EMI banked with Barclays.99 
This wasn’t an unusual scenario; a bank preferring to do business with its customers was 
common practice. The Midland did the same when it ordered a KDP 10 from English 
Electric; English Electric banked with the Midland, they shared a board member, and 
the KDP was manufactured locally in Kidsgrove.100 There isn’t the space to do a detailed 
treatment of all the British clearing banks here, so instead I continue to ‘follow the 
actors’ and summarise the position as seen through the eyes of one of the other clearing 
banks.101 
 
Table 1: Computers and Sorter Readers Ordered by the Banks: Computers, 14 September 1961.102 
Bank Type of Computer Price Remarks 
Barclays Emidec 1100 £150,000 Installed in London. To process 40,000 
Accounts. Operational. 
Coutts Univac S.S. 80 STEP £80,000 To be installed in Spring 1962. 
District - - Hiring time on a Ferranti Pegasus. 
Lloyds 3 IBM RAMAC £350,000 To be installed at Cox & King’s 
Branch, London, to process 30,000 
accounts. 
Martins Ferranti Pegasus II - Installed in Liverpool to process 30,000 
Accounts. Operational. 
Midland English Electric KDP 10 £250,000 To be installed in West End of London 
to process 100,000 accounts. 
National 
Provincial 
Ferranti Orion £200,000 To be installed at end of 1962. To 
process 150,000 accounts. 
Westminster IBM 1401. 
Ferranti Pegasus 
£100,000 
? 
 
Bank of Scotland IBM 1401 £100,000 To be installed in Edinburgh by the end 
of this year. 
 
Table 1, produced by Manchester-based Williams Deacons Bank two months after the 
opening of Barclays’ No. 1 Computer Centre, illustrates Barclays’ leading position in 
relation to the rest of the ‘Big Five’ and to some other smaller but innovative British 
banks.103 At this point it was only Barclays and Martins that were operational with 
computers purchased and installed on their own premises. Lloyds would open its 
computer centre in the West End of London with an IBM 350 installation later that 
month, followed by the Westminster who eventually chose IBM too, but a 1401 model. 
The rest of the ‘Big Five’ set up computer centres of their own soon after. 
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EXPANSION AND CLOSURE 
 
In 1963 with a second Emidec in operation and statement printing moved from the 
branch-based teleprinters to the Anelex line printers in the centre, Drummond Street 
began operating a double shift system. Two shifts of six operators and one programmer 
worked from 8.00 a.m. till 4.00 p.m. and then 4.00 p.m. until midnight or till all the 
evening’s printing had finished.104 Operators not only managed the printing of the 
statements, but also guillotined and packed them up to be delivered to the branches the 
next morning. In times of need when printing carried on well past midnight, computer 
operators would even go as far as delivering the statements to any branches they went 
past on their way home in the morning after a night shift.105 
Working a double shift system allowed the two Emidecs to more than double their 
estimated workload capacities. In 1964 the No. 1 Computer Centre reached its 
rumoured automation target of 50 branches.106 There was now a total of 48 staff 
working at the centre and 11 of these were communications ‘girls’ working during the 
day to deal with incoming paper tape transmissions across 50 GPO lines.107 Take on 
had been cautious but the pace was steadily increased targeting in order those London 
branches in the Pall Mall and London Eastern districts where the shortage of staff and 
the pressure on existing premises was the greatest.108 That year Barclays estimated it 
had saved 142 branch staff as a result of the new computer system and parallel 
developments in the automation of cheque clearing.109 But a look at wider staffing 
figures (Table 2) shows that this figure of 142 was insignificant in comparison to the rise 
in the number of branches and staff over the same period. The 50 automated branches 
represented just 2% of Barclays’ branches nationwide. The business of banking grew 
steadily and those staff shortages in London at the beginning of the sixties were still 
prevalent at its end. In spite of computer centre automation, branch staff continued to 
be drafted in from the provinces to the capital in order to provide relief.110 
 
Table 2: Barclays Branches and Staff in England and Wales 1945-1970.111 
Year Branches  Staff  
1945 1,758 17,355 
1950 2,030 19,047 
1955 2,149 21,137 
1960 2,240 24,951 
1965 2,428 33,240 
1970 3,215 54,905 
 
As the workload of the centre and its staff expanded so too did the attractions it was able 
to offer. Computer centre guests were now treated to computer-generated music. A 
young programmer, David Parsons, who had initially programmed the Emidec so that it 
would print out a history of the No. 1 Computer Centre, now wrote a program that 
made novel use of the speaker built into the machine’s operator control panel. EMI had 
originally provided this speaker to enable audible monitoring of a program’s progress 
and for sounding alerts on successful program end or abnormal termination. An 
enterprising Parsons, following a tradition of computer-generated music stretching back 
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in Britain to 1951 and the University of Manchester’s Ferranti Mark 1 computer,112 
made use of the speaker to have the Emidec play a selection of carols to visitors at 
Christmas time. His program proved so popular that it was even featured on BBC 
radio.113 
In August of 1964 with Barclays head office at Lombard Street attracted to the 
prestige of having its own computer centre, and plans afoot for a third much bigger 
centre to serve the whole of London, the decision was made to close down the No. 1 
Computer Centre at Drummond Street. The former furniture showroom was now 
judged to have served its purpose for Barclays and left its mark. Those initial concessions 
made in the building’s design for visitors and prestige were now re-classed as ‘difficulties 
in continuing to use Drummond Street premises as a Computer Centre’.114 However, it 
would be another six years before the lights were turned off and the technologies and 
people within stopped performing useful work. The centre’s twin Emidecs eventually 
processed the branch accounting for 58 branches and approximately 200,000 
accounts.115 From 1967 these branches were gradually transferred to the Barclays new 
Greater London Computer Centre built nearby in an old piano factory on Tottenham 
Court Road,116 but the No.1 Computer Centre was still operational even as the sixties 
turned into the seventies. New programs were being written for the twin Emidecs as late 
as 1969.117 
However at the beginning of the 1970s the centre finally did close. On the 
afternoon of Wednesday 10 February 1971 every branch in Britain had shut its doors 
not to re-open until the following Monday morning. Over the following weekend the 
No. 1 Computer Centre’s grand reception area was reconfigured and put to use for one 
last time as a distribution point for the pre- and post-decimalisation output produced by 
Barclays’ remaining operational London computer centres numbered 2, 3, and 4. The 
reception’s granite floor was marked out and on it was laid a million statements and 
ledgers ready for collection by a newly decimalised branch network.118 For one last time 
the computer centre’s space was the site of a break from tradition as a pounds shillings 
and pence past was replaced by a decimal future. 
 
 
NOTES
 
1 By the end of the 1950s Ackrill and Hannah, Barclays: The Business of Banking, 1690-1996, 153, has 
Barclays as Britain’s largest bank in terms of deposits. Norman, Banking, 104, lists Barclays’ and the 
Midland’s branch networks as the biggest with both consisting of over 2,300 branches at the beginning of 
the 1960s . 
2 For an introduction to ideas of space and function in architecture see Conway and Roenisch, 
Understanding Architecture, chapter 4, 55-81. 
3 I’m following Gieryn, in particular ‘What Buildings Do’, 35-74, but also influenced by the spatial 
approach taken in his work and others in Smith et al. Making Space for Science: Territorial Themes in the Shaping 
of Knowledge, and Golinski, Making Natural Knowledge. For a global look at the history of technology in use 
see David Edgerton, The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History Since 1900. For technological 
structures built to achieve a specific social effect see Langdon Winner’s classic ‘Do Artifacts have Politics’ 
in Winner, The Whale and the Reactor, 26-38, and Bernward Joerges’ rebuttal: ‘Do Politics Have Artefacts’, 
411-431, and Woolgar & Cooper’s ‘third way’, ‘Do Artifacts Have Ambivalence’. 
4 ‘The Computer Centre Opens’, Spread Eagle, 1961, 252. The day of opening was most likely chosen as a 
Tuesday rather than a Monday because the first day of the week was always an especially busy day due to 
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the requirement to process work carried over from Saturday opening: David Parsons, interview with 
author, Manchester, 7 August 2008. 
5 Barclays Group Archives, Barclays Fact Sheet: Principal Events, 2. 
6 Quote taken from ‘The Computer Centre Opens’, Spread Eagle, 1961, 252. The term clearing banks is a 
contemporary one used to denote those banks that specialised in cheque clearing as opposed to the 
savings banks that predominantly accepted savings deposits. 
7 ‘Electronic methods’ was a term in general use that referred in particular to the use of electronic 
computers. A number of articles in the 1950s hypothesised as to how computers could be applied to 
banking. See for example A. E. Davies, ‘Banking by Electronics’, in The Institute of Bankers in Scotland 
Lectures, 1953-1954, 1953; Mary S. Goldring, ‘Electronics and the Banks I  - Could Computers Help’, The 
Banker, January - December 1953, 140-144; Mary S. Goldring, ‘Electronics and the Banks II  - Costs of 
Electronic Accounting’, The Banker, January - December 1953, 205-208; Mary S. Goldring, ‘Electronics 
and the Banks III  - Cheque-sorting for Clearing’, The Banker, January - December 1953, 285-290. 
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